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Runtime Detection

See every syscall. Stop threats before they spread.

eBPF probes attach to kernel tracepoints at the node level — capturing process ancestry, network connections, and file operations across every container workload with less than 2ms P99 overhead.

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eBPF runtime detection dashboard showing syscall events, process ancestry tree, and container threat alerts in a dark terminal UI

How eBPF Detection Works

Kernel-level visibility, zero instrumentation

Syscall tracepoint probes

The eBPF program attaches to sys_enter_* and sys_exit_* tracepoints. Every open, connect, execve, and ptrace call generates a structured event in the ringbuffer — processed in userspace with <2ms P99 latency.

Process ancestry tree

Each event carries the full process chain from container entrypoint to child process. Detects classic container escape patterns: shell spawning from a web process, unexpected binary execution, namespace escape via clone flags.

Network connection map

Intercepts connect() and accept() calls to build a live network graph of which pods are talking to which endpoints. Unexpected outbound connections to external IPs trigger configurable alerts.

Configurable detection rules

Comes with a baseline ruleset tuned for Kubernetes workloads. Custom rules use a YAML-based format compatible with Falco rule syntax — reuse your existing rules library.

Detection Scenarios

Threats we catch out of the box

Container escape

Privileged container abuse, host namespace access, and mount namespace escape attempts — detected via syscall pattern matching on unshare, clone, and host path mounts.

Reverse shell detection

Shell process spawned from a non-shell parent (e.g. nginx → bash) combined with an outbound TCP connection — high-confidence reverse shell pattern, firing in under 50ms of event arrival.

Cryptominer execution

Detects XMRig and similar miners via binary name + CPU affinity syscalls + outbound connection to mining pool ports. Includes detection of renamed binaries via hash comparison.

Lateral movement

Internal service-to-service connections outside normal network policy, combined with credential-related file reads — catches the early stages of pod-to-pod lateral movement before exfiltration.

Runtime visibility in your cluster today.

Helm install in 15 minutes. First detection finding in the same sprint.